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In theory, stock options should motivate executives to perform better - but in practice, they haven't always had that effect. Why?

In theory, stock options should motivate executives to perform better by tying their pay to their company's performance. So why do some argue the practice has just become a way for the highest earners to boost their salaries even further? Tim Harford turns to ancient Greek philosophy and Bill Clinton's presidency in search of the answer.

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10 minutes

Last on

Mon 2 Dec 2019 04:50GMT

Image credit

A clerk studies his record of securties bought and sold in the basement of Manchester's stock exchange (Credit: Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)

Sources

Aristotle's Politics, Book 1

Derivatives for Decision Makers: Strategic Management Issues - George Crawford and Bidyut Sen, 1996, Wiley and Sons

Research Handbook on Securities Regulation in the United States - Jerry W. Markham, Rigers Giyshi, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing

The Trouble with Stock Options - Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, June 2003, NBER Working Paper No. 9784

Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 2003. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 528

The Impact of Ownership Structure on CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, Master Thesis, 2016-17, Radboud University, Nijmegen Faculty of Management

Broadcasts

  • Sat 30 Nov 2019 05:50GMT
  • Sat 30 Nov 2019 14:50GMT
  • Sun 1 Dec 2019 14:50GMT
  • Sun 1 Dec 2019 15:50GMT
  • Sun 1 Dec 2019 22:50GMT
  • Mon 2 Dec 2019 04:50GMT

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