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New Forms of Fighting
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Message 1.Â
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 11th August 2011
Actually, it's about the same old, but this is a history MB, so.... New Forms of Fighting is the title of a 1940 publication by a professor, the Chief of the Operational Art Faculty of the RKKA (aka Red Army) General Staff G. S. Isserson. Part 2 of this publication is entitled War Between Germany and Poland. Iâm itching to cite a few seemingly ironic observations from chapter 3 called Mistakes by Polish Command and chapter 4 called Polish Plans of Strategic Deployment, with the comments by a present day Russian military historian K. Zakoretzky in brackets. Note that the booklet was published less than a year before the âwar between Germany and USSR.â
âŠ. Polish side thought that the main German forces would be tied up in the West by the French and the British and would not be able to deploy in the East⊠[there are thoughts that RKKA General Staff would anticipate the same, i.e., Wehrmacht would launch its real offensive against the British]âŠ
âŠ. Silesia, where in reality the main thrust by Wehrmacht would be directed, was neglected⊠[so, in 1941, directions of the main thrust by Wehrmacht were neglected?]
âŠ. Polish side thought that Germany would not be able to engage all its mobilized against Poland forces at once⊠Thus, there would be a certain beginning period that would allow the Poles to occupy Danzig and East Prussia. [âŠabout the summer of 1941, weâre also being told that RKKA General Staff allegedly anticipated a certain âbeginning period.â]
âŠ.The basis of Polish strategic deployment in September 1939 was an offensive plan with the objective of occupying Danzig and East Prussia. This plan took strategic arrogance detached from reality to caricature heightsâŠ. [wouldnât RKKA have some offensive plans in the summer of 1941, by any chance?] -
Message 2
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 11th August 2011
the Chief of the Operational Art Faculty of the RKKA (aka Red Army) General Staff G. S. Isserson Missed a word; should read:
the Chief of the Operational Art Faculty of the RKKA (aka Red Army) General Staff Academy G. S. Isserson. -
Message 3
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Saturday, 13th August 2011
Polish side thought that the main German forces would be tied up in the West by the French and the British and would not be able to deploy in the East
That was in fact quite naive. Wasn't that obvious in 1939 that the French and the British were not going to do anything to defend Poland? -
Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 13th August 2011
That was in fact quite naive. Wasn't that obvious in 1939 that the French and the British were not going to do anything to defend Poland? I find this booklet absolutely fascinating, Laura. It's mystifying on so many levels. Mind you, it was written for the RKKA General Staff Academy, so I presume that Isserson himself believed that to have been true (by the way, he would be arrested just a couple of weeks before the launch of Barbarossa, but he'd survive and be released in the 50-s). Do you know of any discussions in Poland about what the military had been doing to prepare for the eventuality of a war? And where did they think the war would likely to break out exactly?
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Message 5
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
That was in fact quite naive. Wasn't that obvious in 1939 that the French and the British were not going to do anything to defend Poland?Â
No, it wasn't. Cynicism certainly existed, possibly prevailed, in London and Paris. Chamberlain wrote in 1938 that military support for Czechoslovakia would be a token gesture and could only be an excuse for declaring war, which only made sense if you expected to win it. It is very likely that he felt the same about Poland in 1939. Both countries were isolated and surrounded by the enemy on three sides. (In Poland's case, that woud turn out to be four.)
But nevertheless, it was rational enough for the Polish leadership to expect that if they could hold out for a number of months, they would receive some help: A mobilised French army would start to exert pressure in the West. Britain would commit its bombers against German targets. The Franco-Polish military agreements presumed as much: A French offensive on day 15 after mobilisation. While that agreement was non-binding, because there was no political agreement, it was fairly obvious that there would be strong political and public pressure to help a fighting Poland. Besides that, the uneasy alliance with Poland was about all that remained of the French policy, since the end of WWI, to seek allies in Eastern Europe. France had even financially supported the Polish army. If Poland could keep enough German soldiers occupied, then it made strategic sense for France and Britain to try to keep it in the war.
And, on paper, the expectation of Poland being able to defend itself for a few months appeared not unrealistic. The Polish army was reasonably strong in numbers and had fought sucessfully in the 1920s. It was, true enough, considerably weaker in tanks and aircraft, and (a familiar theme in WWII) needed several more years to modernise itself and be ready for war. But French generals still expected that the German conquest of Poland would take four to six months... All such notions were swept aside when the German attack broke organized resistance in two weeks. People who had expected that were a minority indeed.
What-If is a dangerous game. The Poland of 1939 was for most practical purposes a military dictatorship: As is more often the case, this resulted in sub-standard performance of the military leadership, because political motives prevailed. A third of the Polish forces was deployed in the trap of the Corridor to Danzig. Much of the rest was deployed very close to the long Western border to defend the industry located there. Deploying the army on interior defensive lines behind rivers would have made the task of the invaders much more difficult, but the sacrifice of territory was unpalatable to Polish nationalists, who always feared (with strong historical justifications) that their neighbors would grab whatever they could. The basic strategy was flawed in a way that confirmed the view of Frederik the Great that "he who defends everything, defends nothing." -
Message 6
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
My view is that - in case of Poland - it has always been, it is and it will be naive to believe that any of so-called great powers is going to provide the country with any major support. Poland could ally with the Ukraininas, get some help from Hungary or Romania, but not from France or Great Britain. Of course in an extreme situation like in 1939 you tend or want to believe in your good intentions of your "friends" but the results are always deplorable. And when you think of what Obama did in case of missile defence shield in Poland you know it's still true.
The only leader who realized that was Pilsudski, unfortunately he was already dead in 1939. -
Message 7
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
A third of the Polish forces was deployed in the trap of the Corridor to Danzig. Much of the rest was deployed very close to the long Western border to defend the industry located there. Deploying the army on interior defensive lines behind rivers would have made the task of the invaders much more difficult, but the sacrifice of territory was unpalatable to Polish nationalists, who always feared (with strong historical justifications) that their neighbors would grab whatever they could. The basic strategy was flawed in a way that confirmed the view of Frederik the Great that "he who defends everything, defends nothing."Â This is great. It appears to be as self-contradicting as what is widely used to explain away the collapse of RKKA in 1941. On one hand, they say that the forces were deployed incorrectly from stand point of defense. On the other, they say that defensive pasture made them vulnerable to begin with. Well, according to Isserson, the Poles did not have defensive pasture, which explains the deployment pattern. They just fell behind in the count, as they say in baseball. Same would be true for RKKA months later. Of course, in 1939, Poland was in much deeper pickle than USSR would be in in 1941. Poland had smaller territory, in addition to the stab in the back by Stalin at a critical juncture.
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Message 8
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
In fact French forces did invade the Saar, restored to Germany after a League of Nations-organised plebiscite in 1935, on 9 September 1939. By the 12th they had advanced five miles on a sixteen-mile front occupying 25 abandoned villages in the no-man's land between the Maginot and Siegfried Lines.
The French were under strict instructions to avoid casualties and most of their casualties resulted from mines and booby-traps left by the Germans. It was to Be France's sole unaccompanied offensive of the whole war.
A French writer, A.Fabre-Luce, in his diary of the first months of the war described the Saar offensive as resembling an 18th-century campaign where
"great nations delegated a few companies to measure their arms; the rest of the nation watched and applauded."
However the Polish campaign represented a clear case of overkill on the part of the Wehrmacht. 'Blitzkrieg' tactics had never been tried out during the course of actual warfare and the German High Command remained divided as to their likely effectiveness. Like the Allies and based on the successful Polish repulsion of the Red Army in 1920 the German generals expected Polish resistance to last several months.
Consequently the Western Front was effectively denuded of regular troops. According to General Westphal, during the whole Polish campaign the frontier from Aachen to Basle was held by no more than 25 reserve, militia and depot divisions without a single tank and only enough ammunition for three days' battle.
At the Nuremberg trials General Milch declared that the Luftwaffe's stock of bombs had been so small at the outbreak of war that the Polish campaign had consumed half of it and Jodl claimed that the ammunition shortages were so severe that the Wehrmacht only managed the Polish campaign due to a lack of a proper Allied offensive in the West.
The weakness of the German strategic position at the outset of the war may have accounted, in large part, for Hitler's 'dismay' when he heard of the Anglo-French declaration of war 2 days into the Polish campaign. Certainly many German generals believed that the Allies had missed a golden opportunity to bring about a swift end to the war and told their captors after the war that they believed that, withm a sufficiently strong offensive, the Allies could have reached the Rhine within a fortnight.
However this ignores the 'Maginot' mentality of the French Army and its commanders, who were simply not adapted to offensive operations and which had inhibited diplomacy from the time of Hitler's remilitirisation of the Rhineland in March 1936. 'Blitzkrieg' tactics exceeded all expectations on both sides. Hitler expressed astonishment that Panzers had overwhelmed a whole Polish artillery division.
As Polish resistance crumbled French incursion into the Saar became even more timid and was halted altogether by Gamelin following Polish capitulation on 28 September with the withdrawal being completed by 4 October.
The French were constantly worried by possible Luftwaffe attacks on Paris, equivalent of the sustained artillery bombardment of 1870 (in the event it was only to be the British and the Americans who were to bomb Paris) and successfully dissuaded the British from carrying out attacks on Berlin or other German cities. (If Milch is to be believed the sustained 'Blitz' on Britain from September 1940-May 1941 was only made possible however because of the interval between the successful conclusion of operations in Western Europe and the opening of Operation Barbarossa).
Not that the War Cabinet needed much persuading, as Churchill was very much the lone voice in urging aggressive action. His plan to drop mines into the Rhine was vetoed on the grounds that it would affect the shipping of neutral countries such as Holland and Switzerland as much as it would affect that of Germany.
Although not a direct belligerent the Soviet invasion of Finland in December 1939 raised similar issues of Allied aid and the form and extent of that aid as the Polish campaign had done, particularly in France where the weak response of the French Army was partially held responsible for the Polish collapse. This was made more evident when initially Finnish resistance proved to be as determined and successful as Polish resistance had been expected to be.
Although neither Britain nor France were not technically in a state of war with the Soviet Union it was seen as an ally of Germany having participated in the invasion of Poland and a successful defence of Finland was considered to be a big contribution to the war effort. However after much prevarication and delay an Allied plan to seize the port of Narvik in order to send supplies to the Finns had to be aborted although this plan remerged in the Norway campaign of the following month.
The failure to assist first Poland and then Finland led to the downfall of the Daladier Government in March 1940 and his replacement as Premier by Reynaud but in the end France's real problem lay not in its failure to defend other countries but in its inability to defend itself. -
Message 9
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Like the Allies and based on the successful Polish repulsion of the Red Army in 1920 the German generals expected Polish resistance to last several months.
Really? Seems to me quite unlikely taking into account that in 1939 Polish army was poorly equipped and this fact was widely know. -
Message 10
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Muller-Hillebrandt wrote that Wehrmacht plans for Polish campaign were based on the assumption that it will last up to four months, if I remember correctly. He also pointed out that munition requirements for this baseline were not nearly met. And, according to Kesselring, Guderian, Rendulich, Godt, Schneider and other Wehrmacht brass, Luftwaffe bombs indeed ran out on the fourteenth day of the campaign.
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Message 11
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Air raids on warsaw itself lasted from the beginning of the invasion until the end of september with the heaviest bombing on September 25th. Not possible that Luftwaffe ran out of bombs already after 14 days, if after 25 days it was able to undertake so intensive actions.
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Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Air raids on warsaw itself lasted from the beginning of the invasion until the end of september with the heaviest bombing on September 25th. It is plausible if, say, there was a gap between the 14th and the 25th for a few days.
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Message 13
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Yes. German industry had simply not been put on a war footing and the advances of the Wehrmacht, the proponents of newly-mechanized warfare, were severely hindered throughout the war by failures of supply. "operation Sea-Lion" was nullified at the outset by a shortage of invasion barges, a large proportion of the existing stock of which had been lost, or failed to be recovered during the Norwegian campaign.
The lack of motorised troop transports before the start of Operation Barbarossa meant that the Wehrmacht would be as dependent on the horse and human feet as Napoleon's Grand Army had been from the outset with the consequence that, given the geographical extent of the country, the campaign was bound to be a prolonged one regardless of the resistance of the Red Army.
The German munitions industry was not put on an efficient footing until the appointment of Speer as Armaments Minister in February 1942 and even then it was never mobilised as effectively as the war industries of Britain, America and the Soviet Union. Hitler's refusal to conscript indigenous labour, including female labour, led to an over-reliance on slave and forced labour from the occupied countries to fulfil Germany's war needs.
The problem of WWII is not why Germany lost but why it took so long to defeat her. -
Message 14
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Air raids on warsaw itself lasted from the beginning of the invasion until the end of september with the heaviest bombing on September 25th. It is plausible if, say, there was a gap between the 14th and the 25th for a few days.  Right, let's not forget however about other Polish cities affected by heavy bombings from the first day of the the German invasion until its end (i.e. the whole september 1939)
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Message 15
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Not possible that Luftwaffe ran out of bombs already after 14 days, if after 25 days it was able to undertake so intensive actions.Â
The consumption of bombs in that first month of war was approximately seven times production. The Luftwaffe had ammunition stocks reckoned to be only large enough for only about three weeks of all-out war, and it was quickly exhausting them. But that does not mean it was completely running out of bombs, just that future bombing operations would be limited by the pace of production, whatever that might be.
Also, not all types and sizes of bombs would be running out at the same time. The mission planners, if they did not have the type of bombs that they preferred for a target, would load other ones. -
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
The German munitions industry was not put on an efficient footing until the appointment of Speer as Armaments Minister in February 1942Â
That, of course, is what Speer liked people to believe. It deserves to be annotated a bit.
Germany actually began the war at a fairly high state of mobilization, and this gave its forces their early advantage over the opposition. Its essential problem was that it did not have enough steel, oil, or coal to feed the hungry war machine. For example, when war broke out, the regime made deep cuts in non-military use of steel, giving the Wehrmacht 55% of all production. But that still was not enough to make enough guns AND ammunition, and the army repeatedly faced the choice between equipping new units or producing ammunition for the existing ones. An expansion of motorized transport, or even just keeping the railways running efficiently, required resources that didn't exist. It was also difficult to find the raw materials to construct new weapons factories.
As armaments minister, Speer intentionally overstated the increase in production that he had achieved, in close collaboration with Goebbels: It was a propaganda effort designed to renew confidence in victory. In reality he did achieve a significant increase, and some of that was indeed achieving by taking even more resources out of the civilian economy. But the largest efficiency gains were due to rationalization within the German military-industrial complex. Lack of central oversight, inefficient organization of production, and the tendency to build a great number of types of equipment in small runs were the real real weaknesses, especially in aircraft production. Speer also profited from the investments in heavy industry that his predecessors had made.
Incidentally, the Nazis unwillingness to use female labour is often quoted as an example of backward policies that hurt their war effort, and there is something in this. But the additional female workforce that could be mobilized was small, because the number of women workers was already high before the war. In reality, proportionally more women were at work in Germany than in Britain or the USA. They were, however, mostly on farms instead of in factories: As the men were called up for the army, the women had to keep the farms running, as they had done since time immemorial. -
Message 17
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Does anyone know what was the estimated forced labour input?
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Message 18
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
The Nazi Germans abducted approximately 12 million people from almost twenty European countries; about two thirds of whom came from the Eastern Europe...At its peak the forced labourers comprised 20% of the German work force. Countings deaths and turnover, about 15 million men and women were forced laborers at one point or another during the war.Â
MM's points are valid ones. There was undoubtedly a great deal of personal vanity on Speer's part but he himself paid tribute to the forced labour regime when, in his testimony at Nuremberg, he stated that whenever he asked for more labour Sauckel always gave it to him, by whatever method he chose.
Speer's contribution to the war effort should however not be underestimated especially when the Reich came under sustained air bombardment from 1943 onwards and the demands of a 3-front war had to be supplied. It is difficult to believe that German resistance could have continued for as long as it did without someone of Speer's organisational drive and improvisational ability.
As far as the agricultural sector is concerned it should not be forgotten that PoWs and forced labourers were used as much in Germany as farmworkers as they were industrial workers. The USA and the Soviet Union managed to conscript women into the workforce despite having far larger agricultural sectors than Germany whilst Britain conscripted young, single women as farm labourers. -
Message 19
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
The USA and the Soviet Union managed to conscript women into the workforce despite having far larger agricultural sectors than Germany whilst Britain conscripted young, single women as farm labourers. Stalin all but wiped out the Soviet "agricultural sector" in the 30-s, Alan.
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Message 20
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
Good point, Suvorovetz!
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Message 21
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
The USA and the Soviet Union managed to conscript women into the workforce despite having far larger agricultural sectors than Germany whilst Britain conscripted young, single women as farm labourers.Â
Yes, but German agriculture far was less efficient than US agriculture. Most German farms were small family farms lacking mechanised tools. The ministery of agriculture was indeed the first to resort to forced labour, because it was worried about a possible return of WWI conditions. The USA was an exporter, in Germany there was no food surplus but instead regular worries about shortages.
In the USSR the problem was different again: Famines in the countryside marked Stalin's regime, also post-war. And many of them were intentional. -
Message 22
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 14th August 2011
small family farms lacking mechanised tools.Â
That could also be a description of British agriculture in WWII. Mechanisation did not become commonplace on British farms until the 1950s thanks to large government subsidies and Messrs Massey & Ferguson. Central government direction, generous financial aid and a supply of (reasonably) willing labour ensured that 50% of what Britons ate was home-grown by the end of WWII - a massive increase on the pre-war situation where domestic production had been falling since the 1870s.
Curiously Germany appeared to suffer no serious food shortages during WWII despite the presence of a large (for figures see above) 'guest worker' population and the absence of an organised ration system and a determined effort, such as occurred in Britain, to boost domestic food production. This may have been due to the large agricultural areas in Europe, including the Ukraine, that the Germans occupied whose products the Nazis commandeered for themselves.
It was only after the war when the Soviets occupied the prime agricultural territory of Germany in the East, sending its products to feed their own population because of their own agronomic failure (yes, Suvo, believe it or not I do know about the failures of Stalin's collectivisation policy and have drawn attention to it several times on these boards myself - I was merely making the point that farming does not require a large number of stay-at-home housewives) prompting the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947.
By contrast, food shortages were a significant part of the German ±«Óătv Front (and military too) in WWI from 1916 onwards owing to the British naval blockade with a concomitant depressing effect on civilian morale. It was food rioting in October-November 1918 that erupted into the unrest that removed the Kaiser and forced the German Government to sue for peace.
The failure of the Reichswehr to press home its advantage after the Kaiserschlacht of March 1918 has often been ascribed to ill-nourished German troops coming across the amply-filled Allied rations stores and refusing to leave, despite their officers' imprecations, until they had devoured them. -
Message 23
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Although neither Britain nor France were not technically in a state of war with the Soviet Union it was seen as an ally of Germany having participated in the invasion of Poland and a successful defence of Finland was considered to be a big contribution to the war effort.Â
Why were Britain and France so pre-occupied with helping the Finns against the Russians when surely this would benefit the Germans in terms of the broader picture? -
Message 24
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Why were Britain and France so pre-occupied with helping the Finns against the Russians when surely this would benefit the Germans in terms of the broader picture? Because, prior to the summer of 1941, the USSR was allied with Germany, and Finland was not, that's why.
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Message 25
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Yes, the Communist Parties of both France and Britain were both actively opposed to the war under instructions from Moscow, denouncing it as a capitalist trick devised to divide the working class. The British Government had suppressed publication of the BCP's organ, "The Daily Worker" and in France Communist shop stewards were engaged in the industrial sabotage of aircraft and machine tool factories as well as sklowing production through work stoppages - activities they would later come to regret.
However the pointI was trying to make that the sympathy towards Finland, particularly in France, was a displacement of guilt for the failure to help Poland. The Poles were justified in expecting help in the form of an attack in the West to take the pressure off them in line with the Anglo-French guarantee rather merely a legalistic declaration of war and then being left to face the full brunt of blitkrieg tactics.
However Gamelin epitomised the attitude of the French military and political elites in an interview he gave to the British war correspondent, Antony Gibbs, shortly after he had closed down the Saar 'offensive' . Oddly, he compared it to the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line at the start of 1917 He went on:
It was simply a token invasion...We do not wish to fight on their territory. We did not ask for this war! ...Now that the Polish question is liquidated - he shrugged - we have gone back to our lines. What else did you expect?Â
It is difficult to sympathise with the same military and political elites who loudly berated the British for betraying and deserting them in June 1940 by putting their own national interest first given their attitude to both the Poles and the Finns.
Apologies for the superfluous 'not' in my previous message. In correcting my post I had overlooked the fact that I had used the word 'neither' . Britain and France were not in a state of war with the Soviet Union although, arguably, under the terms of the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland of April 1939, they ought to have been following the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September and the mutually agreed division of Poland with Germany following Poland's capitulation (which had already been settled in the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 22 August). -
Message 26
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 15th August 2011
mutually agreed division of Poland with Germany following Poland's capitulation (which had already been settled in the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 22 August). cough...the 23rd...cough...sorry.
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Message 27
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Another point to be made is that later on in the war the British and Americans drew up contingency plans - Operation 'Sledge Hammer' - for what would have amounted to a suicidal assault on the Western Wall in the event that the Russian front looked close to collapsing. The Anglo-American concern to keep an Eastern front going at all costs, even that of their own armies, contrasts sharply with the Anglo-French attitude towards the Polish campaign at the start of the war although given the imbalance of forces deployed it is hardly surprising
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Message 28
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Quite right, Suvo, late in the evening of the 23rd, apologies. The Soviets announced the Ribbentrop visit on the 22nd, a day after talks had been broken off with the Drax Anglo-French mission.
One suspects that the basis of the deal had been worked out well in advance and most of it sat in Ribbentrop's pocket on the plane over. Unlike the British and the French I doubt if Ribbentrop would have gone to Moscow if he had been doubtful as to the outcome. -
Message 29
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Because, prior to the summer of 1941, the USSR was allied with Germany, and Finland was not, that's why. Â
Who would Nazi Germany be wanting to win, the Finns or the Russians? -
Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Who would Nazi Germany be wanting to win, the Finns or the Russians? This question is about as ground breaking as the question, who would Stalin's Russia be wanting to win, the Germans or the Poles - that'd be prior to September 17th, when RKKA doubled-down to effectively finish off the Poles. Or, perhaps, who would Nazi Germany be wanting to win, the Latvians or the Russians?
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Message 31
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Why would Britain and France lend support to an outcome that would favour Nazi Germany?
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Message 32
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 15th August 2011
Why would Britain and France lend support to an outcome that would favour Nazi Germany? Why would Britain and France want an outcome that would favor Stalin's Soviet Union?
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Message 33
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Another point to be made is that later on in the war the British and Americans drew up contingency plans - Operation 'Sledge Hammer' - for what would have amounted to a suicidal assault on the Western Wall in the event that the Russian front looked close to collapsing.Â
To be precise, the Americans drew up that plan. It amounted to an American willingness to sacrifice the British army to keep the USSR in the war -- as there were few American troops in Europe in 1942. Understandably enough, the British were firmly opposed to it.
The more optimistic view of this contingency plan was that it covered the possibility that Germany would suddenly collapse. Then troops could be sent ashore against little opposition, to prevent Stalin from occupying the whole continent.
But anyway, in 1941-1942 Britain and the USA were willing to go far to keep the USA in the war, sending armaments of which they themselves had a great need to prop up their own positions. That willingness did not exist towards Poland in 1939. Nor, really, towards Finland during the Winter War: Such equipment as was sent, was mostly obsolescent or unwanted. -
Message 34
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Why would Britain and France want an outcome that would favor Stalin's Soviet Union?Â
To contain Nazi Germany? Supporting the Finns would surely encourage Germany's expansion eastwards. -
Message 35
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
To contain Nazi Germany? Supporting the Finns would surely encourage Germany's expansion eastwards. stuart, did the marxist site you're learning the world history from ever cited the text of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, particularly the text of the secret protocol and the map attached to the secret protocol? But - what I find the most ironic - I bet you a nickel, your marxist site never cited Stalin's speech to selected members of the Communist International made on August 19, 1939 in Moscow (that would be just four days before the Pact signing), and neither it ever cited the instructions to European branches of the Comintern written along the lines of this speech and distributed shortly thereafter.
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Message 36
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Why were Britain and France so pre-occupied with helping the Finns against the Russians...Â
In 1941, the Finns were popularly seen as German allies and hence baddies. In November 1939, they had been heroic resisters against Soviet aggression. But twenty years earlier, they had also been German allies and baddies, under that wicked White oppressor General Mannerheim. So much so that we sent an expeditionary force to support the 'Red Finns' against him.
The fact that each of these reversals of popular opinions of those good/bad Finns could take place without reference to the previous attitude was remarked at the time as an indication of the shortness of historical memory. (e.g. R.Graves and A.Hodge 'The Long Weekend') -
Message 37
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
It should be pointed out that although it could be said that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were allies between augst 1939 and June 1941 even if the Soviet Union, apart from the brief period of the Polish campaign was a non-belligerent one - the USSR was the largest supplier of raw materials, coal, iron ore and oil to Nazi Germany at generous discount prices and supplied far more material than the USA did to Britain during the same period of time enabling Germany to nullify the British naval blockade - nevertheless to call them 'allies' is to stretch the meaning of the word to breaking point.
The word 'ally' implies mutual interest, shared understanding, common goals even friendship. None of this applied to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union at this time. For both of the dictators the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the attendant economic agreements, the last of which was concluded as late as January 1941 was a means to an end.
Hitler had built his whole political career on destroying Bolshevism and what Donald Rumsfeld might have described as the swamp from which it emanated, the Soviet Union. As far as Hitler was concerned the destruction of Poland and the subjugation of France were the hors d'oeuvres before he tackled the main course. The real war for him began on 22 June 1941 not 1 September 1939. He just didn't want to have too many courses on his plate at once, like any good diner.
For Stalin, on the other hand, supplying Hitler's war machine was rather like holding out meat to a rabid dog. The more you kept it occupied the less likely it would be to attack.
What is significant is that Hitler saw the conflict with Finland as a direct threat to his future plans, however one that could be contained. In a speech to his senior commanders on 23 November 1939, a week before Stalin ordered hostilities to begin wiith his northern neighbour, Hitler outlined the position as he saw it:
Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many internal conditions. Moreover, we have the treaty with Russia. Treaties, however, are kept only as long as they serve aq purpose. Russia will only keep it as long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit.... Now, Russia still has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the west.Â
Consequently the pact with Stalin would serve the same purpose as the defensive mentality of the Western Allies and the antipathy to the war in general by commanders like Gamelin had done during the Polish campaign and enable him to leave his eastern border lightly defended whilst he concentrated his forces in the West - the mirror image of the position at the start of the
Once France, and hopefully Britain (although she didn't really matter as she had no standing army to speak of), had been eliminated from the conflict complete attention could be given to the main event - the destruction of the Soviet Union.
However he was alert to the possibility that a successful Finnish campaign would massively strengthen Stalin's hand in the Baltic and also to the possibility that if the Allies seized Narvik to supply the Finns this would also result in his supply of iron ore from Sweden, which was shipped from that port, being cut off. Consequently Hitler ordered the German High Command to draw up plans for theinvasion of Denmark and Norway on 14 December, a fortnight into the Russo-Finnish War.
It was the possibility of cutting off the northern route for German iron ore supplies that so commended itself to Churchill who became a warm advocate of the scheme to occupy Narvik. Although it offered to strike a twin blow at both the dictatorships and although Churchill had a firm history of anti-communism I doubt if he wished to embroil Britain in a war with the Soviet Union as he was by now almost an apologist for Stalin in the War Cabinet.
He had been one of the few Conservatives to support a military alliance with the Soviet Union before the war as a means of deterring Germany and in a radio broadcast 6 weeks into the war he even spoke warmly of the Soviet incursion into Poland both establishing a common border and keeping the Nazis further removed them (which proved absolutely futile when Hitler invaded in 1941 - despite this Churchill upheld the seizure of Polish territory under the Ribbentrop-Molotov after the war, much to the chagrin of the Free Poles, even though he nullified the cession of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany under the Munich Agreement).
The Allies, were in a different position from both the dictatorships. Firstly they were democracies and although normal party strife was suspended for the duration they still had to worry about public opinion which never troubled Stalin or Hitler.
The Allies had gone to war over a principle - the right of nations to exist without having their territory and sovereignty violated by the brute force of a neighbour. To declare war on behalf of Poland and do nothing about Finland would be inconsistent, to say the least - the current examples of Libya and Syria spring to mind.
Finland, like Poland, had achieved its sovereignty with the break-up of the Russian Empire and had had its independence recognised by the Western Allies in the post-war settlement. Unlike Poland, it had remained a genuine democracy.
Thus there was every reason to go to the aid of the Finns. Of course nothing had really been done to help the Poles as I have already outlined and the plan to help the Finns was slowly strangled by futile diplomacy, bureaucracy and delay. Meanwhile the Finns fought on bravely in the hope that help would arrive sooner rather later but even they gave up hope (ironically at the point when the plan was about to be implemented although there is strong doubt as to its success) and ceded large tracts of territory to an enemy to whom they had at least given a bloody nose.
WWII is often portrayed as a war of democracy v. dictatorship. This, as Evelyn Waugh might have said, was only trueup to a point, Lord Copper. Stalin appeared to be the biggest beneficiary at the end of war and turned nations like Czechoslovakia, which had been a democracy before the war into a one-party dictatorship after it.
Britain went to the aid of Greece, a military dictatorship, in April 1941 and the Allies received the loan of the Azores as an anti-U boat base from the Fascist dictator of Portugal, Salazar, in 1943 which Churchill called the most unselfish act by any neutral apart from Lend-Lease.
Finland, a genuine democracy, joined the Axis in June 1941 to participate in Operatyion Barbarossa and recover its lost territory. Desopite being successful in this at the end of the war it was made to forfeit it again and the gains of the Winter War, like the seizure of eastern Poland, were legitimated with the collusion of the Western Powers. Uniquely of the Axis Powers Finland was forced to pay reparations to the Soviet Union for the temerity in having been attacked by it. -
Message 38
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Alan Finland, a genuine democracy, joined the Axis in June 1941 to participate in Operatyion Barbarossa and recover its lost territory. This is a principally inaccurate statement. Although the Finnish military brass was negotiating contingent military cooperation with Wehrmacht in the months preceding the launch of Barbarossa, this was done under duress, i.e., open and blatant threat of another RKKA invasion. These negotiations NEVER resulted in any formal agreement, or, in other words, NO EVIDENCE of any such agreement was ever found. At the same time, it was not Finland who joined Wehrmacht in June of 1941; it was RKKA who, in violation of the peace treaty between Finland and USSR in effect at the time, opened up on the Finns on June 25th, 1941. Mark Solonin published a detailed study of the conflict, or, to be precise, two distinct conflicts (the Winter War of December 1939 through March 1940 and the war of 1941 through 1944). Here are some excerpts:
-
Message 39
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
To declare war on behalf of Poland and do nothing about Finland would be inconsistent, to say the least - the current examples of Libya and Syria spring to mind. Â
No more 'inconsistent' than preaching the 'right of nations' yet at the same time ruling over colonies across the globe- or preaching 'democracy' whilst refusing to back the democrats in Spain. -
Message 40
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Yes I accept what you say, Suvo. My statement was far too loosely worded. What I meant was that the Finnish Army participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union. Finnish troops fought at Stalingrad. The point I was attempting, very poorly, to make was that the Finns recovered their territory lost in the Winter War only to have to forfeit it again after the end of the war.
Curiously, the two countries to lose territory at the end of the war, with Western Allied connivance, were Poland (due to the Ribbentrop-Molotov cession being confirmed) and Finland, who were both considered victims of aggression at the beginning of the war although Poland was compensated with 20% of Germany. -
Message 41
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
whilst refusing to back the democrats in Spain.Â
You mean the side where the Soviet secret police spent its time eliminating the anarchists, as described in Orwell's memoir "Homage to Catalonia"? -
Message 42
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 16th August 2011
Finnish troops fought at Stalingrad.Â
I never heard of that, and I have my doubts. Mannerheim's commanders had a hard time maintaining their troopsâ morale, when some units crossed the 1939 line for tactical considerations, not to mention the scarcity of the Finnish troops in the first place. Could you give me the source of this information?
Curiously, the two countries to lose territory at the end of the war, with Western Allied connivance, were Poland (due to the Ribbentrop-Molotov cession being confirmed) and Finland, who were both considered victims of aggression at the beginning of the war although Poland was compensated with 20% of Germany. Not to mention the fact that the Finns were forced to pay reparations to the USSR for years. Nevertheless, as Solonin perceptively pointed out, when one crosses the border from Russia to Finland, he or she wonders about who paid reparations to whom, with such a vivid display of the advantages of years of marxist economics at work when contrast and compare...
-
Message 43
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
The Allies had gone to war over a principle - the right of nations to exist without having their territory and sovereignty violated by the brute force of a neighbour. .Â
Britain went to war because we had given a guarantee to Poland in what we considered to be our long term national interest i.e. to preserve the balance of power in Europe.
That isn't my expression of cynicism about British foreign policy - I do not think that any British politician would have disputed it. This is a generation who had experienced war. They would have thought the idea that they should send British soldiers to their death in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Finland was absurd.
When Chamberlain said:
"How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."
and;
"We had no treaty obligations and no legal obligations to Czechoslovakia and if we had said that, we feel that we should have received no support from the people of this country. . . "
he was reflecting the views in the letters he had been sent, of every major newspaper and the massive crowds that lined the streets to cheer him.
Remember, it is one thing to bravely send a small professional army to fight for abstract principles, far away, especially if it is safely in the past! But a war where we are likely to be conscripted to fight ourselves? And where the enemy could hit back at our family at home? You don't get into that sort of war unless you really have to. -
Message 44
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
You mean the side where the Soviet secret police spent its time eliminating the anarchists, as described in Orwell's memoir "Homage to Catalonia"?Â
But the reason that the CP in Spain behaved in such a way towards more radical left wing forces was because Stalin wanted to curry favour with Britain and France (a 'popular frontist' alliance against Germany), hence they clamped down on anyone who was opposed to the so-called 'liberal-capitalists', anyone who favoured some expropriation of property as being a component of anti-fascist struggle. -
Message 45
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
But the reason that the CP in Spain behaved in such a way towards more radical left wing forces was because Stalin wanted to curry favour with Britain and France That's another 'milestone' for you, stuart.
Now all you have to do is dig up a quote, in which Stalin explains any of his actions by a desire to curry favour with Britain and France. -
Message 46
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
Finnish troops fought at Stalingrad.Â
I never heard of that, and I have my doubtsÂ
And your doubts would be totally justified. My bad. About 200,000 Rumanians, 100,000 Italians, perhaps 70,000 "Hiwis" or Russian and Ukranian volunteers and perhaps even a few French but no Finns. Obviously I can't tell my Rumanians from my Finns! -
Message 47
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
Soviet intervention in Spain was a strong argument for non-intervention. Conservatives in Britain and France were able to present the civil war not as a struggle between fascism and democracy but as one between two equally unpalatable forms of totalitarianism. Even Leon Blum's Popular Front Government in France maintained, at least outwardly, a strict non-interventionist policy and it was fear that the conflict might spread northwards that contributed to the collapse of the Popular Front Government in 1937.
Curiously, Churchill began as a strong supporter of Franco, much as he had earlier supported Mussolini, refusing to shake hands with the Spanish Ambassador at a reception, but as the war progressed and the Republic became more of a Soviet satellite he became more sympathetic to the Republican side which might indicate the extent of his pro-Soviet sympathies. -
Message 48
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
Also Hungarians and Croats should be added to the list.
-
Message 49
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
The USSR favoured, in both Spain and France, a 'bourgeios republic'. Britain and France, even when Blum ruled in France, were not bothered about a Franco victory, even though he was actively supported by Hitler and Mussolini..
In Spain, the repressive measures that were carried out by the CP, and by extension Moscow and Stalin's secret service, were directed at those left wing forces who were critical of a 'bourgeios republic', such as the POUM and the CNT. -
Message 50
Posted by stuart (U1648283) on Wednesday, 17th August 2011
Now all you have to do is dig up a quote, in which Stalin explains any of his actions by a desire to curry favour with Britain and France. Â
''In the present phase a number of capitalist states are also concerned to maintain peace. Hence the possibility of creating a broad front of the working class, of all working people, and of entire nations against the danger of imperialist war.â''
Resolution of the Comintern executive, April 1936.
âThe peace policy of the Soviet Government is in conformity with the historic instructions of Lenin; it is firmly conducted by Stalin; it corresponds to the interests of the international proletariat ... there is, for the moment, a correspondence of interest between bourgeois France and the Soviet Union against Hitler.â M. Thorez - French CP leader, in 1935 following the 'mutual security pact' with France.
Both quotes taken from
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