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Jutland

• Message 1.Ìý

  Posted by alanpatten (U1866183) on Sunday, 9th October 2011

  I have just finished reading "Jutland, the German Perspective" by V. E. Tarrant.
  ISBN 1-86019-917-8, and found it very interesting indeed. Lots of maps, diagrams and statistics.
  
  The author considers this to have been a German victory tactically, but a British victory strategically. This is because the German High Seas Fleet never offered battle again. The Kaiser had decided that un-restricted submarine warfare was a quicker and cheaper way to bring Britain to her knees. Unfortunately this was one of the prime reasons for the US to enter the war on the side of the allies.
  
  Thus, one could argue that, one of the main results of the battle of Jutland was the eventual defeat of Germany in WWI.
  
  Regards......................Alan

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• Message 2

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  Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Sunday, 9th October 2011

  alanpatten
  
  That seems to be in line with the usual assessment..
  
  In addition to the Germans focussing on the U boat campaign I believe it also meant that the Germans could not break the British Naval blockade- that major arm of British power that very rarely gets a mention- which is scant justice to the British seamen who spent says and weeks at sea maintaining it..
  
  Somewhat controversially it was maintained over the winter of 1918-19 after the Armistice had brought an end to the fighting on the land. I believe that Winston Churchill was one of those who called for Britain to lift the blockade and spare the German people another winter of starvation and hardship..
  
  The point was made quite forcibly by Dick Sheppard's biographer in Autumn 1939 who, while not embracing "Dick's" total rejection of war, also said that had Britain behaved with more Christian humanity at that time, perhaps the war that had just begun would have been avoided.
  
  Cass

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  Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Sunday, 9th October 2011

  It's been said that John Jellicoe was the only person who could win or lose the war for Britain in afternoon.
  
  In the end it took an afternoon, an evening and a night - but by the morning of 1 June 1916 he'd won it.

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  Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 10th October 2011

  To say that at Jutland, the High Seas Fleet "offered battle" stretches language a bit. The German battleships had that opportunity twice, when Scheer ran into Jellicoe's fleet, and both times they executed a 180 degrees turn to get away as quickly as possible. The second time, Scheer was willing to sacrifice his battlecruisers to save his battleships.
  
  Offering battle was, given the disparity of strength between the German and British fleets, a suicidal option. German naval officers might have toasted on "Der Tag" when they would finally meet the Royal Navy in battle, but their superiors were more realistic. The battleship and battlecruiser building contest that had done so much to sour German-British relations before WWI, had been won by the British shipyards with a substantial margin. Scheer's desperate "Combat Turns" at Jutland illustrated the folly of the naval policy of Wilhelm II. The High Seas Fleet was unable to challenge the RN or break the blockade, in fact unable to do anything that could justify its staggering cost.
  
  At best it could hope to win a skirmish. Scheer and Hipper hoped to lure part of the Royal Navy, especially Beatty's battlecruisers, in a trap and destroy them. While their plan did not work, they indeed won a tactical victory over Beatty's ships.
  
  As for Jellicoe, he was extremely unlikely to lose the war in an afternoon. The point was more that he already enjoyed a position of strength, even a crushing superiority, and therefore had no incentive at all to risk it in a battle. Even if both sides had returned to base without a shot being fired, the RN would have scored a strategic victory.
  
  The real "result" of Jutland was that it changed nothing at all. Except perhaps the morale of the German crews, who started the mutinies of 1918.
  

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  Posted by FulwellLib (U14560427) on Monday, 10th October 2011

  I think the best one line sumation of the battle was one made by an American journalist at the time when he said that 'The prisoner had assaulted the jailer but remained in jail.'

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  Posted by RusEvo (U2126548) on Friday, 14th October 2011

  I think the best one line sumation of the battle was one made by an American journalist at the time when he said that 'The prisoner had assaulted the jailer but remained in jail.'Ìý Thats a nice concise way of putting it.
  
  Was it really a German tactical victory? It always seemed to me like the Germans got a good start, but were then forced to run away in a great panic (without really achieving their goals and swearing never to do that again). Sounds like a mistake rather than a victory.
  
  
  
  

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  Posted by VF (U5759986) on Saturday, 15th October 2011

  To say that at Jutland, the High Seas Fleet "offered battle" stretches language a bit. The German battleships had that opportunity twice, when Scheer ran into Jellicoe's fleet, and both times they executed a 180 degrees turn to get away as quickly as possible. The second time, Scheer was willing to sacrifice his battlecruisers to save his battleships.
  
  Offering battle was, given the disparity of strength between the German and British fleets, a suicidal option. German naval officers might have toasted on "Der Tag" when they would finally meet the Royal Navy in battle, but their superiors were more realistic. The battleship and battlecruiser building contest that had done so much to sour German-British relations before WWI, had been won by the British shipyards with a substantial margin. Scheer's desperate "Combat Turns" at Jutland illustrated the folly of the naval policy of Wilhelm II. The High Seas Fleet was unable to challenge the RN or break the blockade, in fact unable to do anything that could justify its staggering cost.
  
  At best it could hope to win a skirmish. Scheer and Hipper hoped to lure part of the Royal Navy, especially Beatty's battlecruisers, in a trap and destroy them. While their plan did not work, they indeed won a tactical victory over Beatty's ships.
  
  As for Jellicoe, he was extremely unlikely to lose the war in an afternoon. The point was more that he already enjoyed a position of strength, even a crushing superiority, and therefore had no incentive at all to risk it in a battle. Even if both sides had returned to base without a shot being fired, the RN would have scored a strategic victory.
  
  The real "result" of Jutland was that it changed nothing at all. Except perhaps the morale of the German crews, who started the mutinies of 1918.
  Ìý Agree with most of what you say MM.
  
  The Germans knew that their best (if only chance) to best the RN was to trap a portion of it and destroy it to level the numbers.They almost achieved it following the Scarborough raid when Admiral Warrender could have run into the HSF.As luck would have it action was avoided.
  
  As for Jutland....
  
  Im not a fan of Beatty,brave as he might be I personally think that he made some serious errors in the initial actions that may well have contributed to the loss of two battlecruisers in the "run to the south",the first managing to leave Evan Thomas and the 5th Battle squadron way behind playing catch up,the second was not using his superior range and third, despite the fiasco of Dogger Bank where SMS Moltke was given a free run as not one ship engaged her,the mistake was repeated when Derflingger was left unmolested.
  
  Whilst Beatty redeems himself slightly for his performance in the "run to the north" its worth pointing out that he didn't signal Jelicoe any information about where exactly he was or more importantly where the HSF was. Jelicoe had to make a guess and get his deployment spot on,which he did with some aplomb.
  Finally Beatty's performance post Jutland was nothing short of a disgrace with the "Jutland Scandal" and his suppression of the Official History of the battle by Harper as it was probably just a little bit too honest for Beatty's liking.He also was non to complementry about his fellow officers, and shunned his Flag Officer Ralph Seymour when he had the audacity to propose to a relative of his wife. He claimed that Seymour "lost three battles for him",well all fool Beatty for keeping him on.In any case Seymour,dismayed at been thrown out to the cold by the Beatty's committed suicide by throwing himself of Beachy head.
  
  Jelicoe,for all the criticism laid at his door did no more that what he had already stated previous to the battle and what had been agreed by the Admiralty.Should he have turned towards the HSF fleet? Hindsight and armchair admirals suggest that the nelsonian thing to do would been to take the chance.However in his defence its worth pointing out that HMS Marlborough, a modern super dreadnought had taken one torpedo hit and ended up in serious trouble.Jellicoe was a long way from home and could have lost a fair few vessels.
  
  For me Jelicoes mistakes were part of a deeper problem in the RN,the wish to centralise everything and an over reliance on the rulebook. During the night action that followed SMS Seydlitz was spotted by several dreadnoughts and yet not one opened fire with the reason being given that they would await orders from the flagship and that they didn't want to give away their position,the same happened when a "Westfalen" class dreadnought was spotted.Now given that the Seydlitz virtually sank in the Jade it would have taken much to sink her there and then. Several ships observed that action was taking place behind the fleet where the light forces were located yet nobody seems to have put two and two together or informed the CinC!
  
  Had Seydlitz been sunk and possible another heavy unit then the balance sheet looks a lot rosier for the British.
  
  In any case the net result was that Sheer told the Kaiser that the HSF could not win the war at see and that the U-Boat,not the dreadnought was Germany's best option.That was the result of Jutland for me,which lead to a stagnation of the HSF (which contrary to popular belief did sortie into the North Sea again) and eventual mutiny that sealed the revolution in Germany.Additionally the Grand Fleet after coaling was ready for action on the 1st July 1916 the HSF was not.
  
  So tactical victory for the germans,strategic victory for the British.
  
  Best Admiral on the day ? For me Hipper,didn't put a foot wrong.

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