The pandemic has unleashed a global wave of government spending, much of it disbursed quickly, at scale and under difficult circumstances. With it have come concerns over fresh opportunities for corruption.

While much international effort has been dedicated to tackling corruption in recent years, little of it appears to have paid off. Transparency International concluded in their most recent global that “most countries have made little or no progress in tackling corruption in almost a decade”. 

This lack of progress prompted a rare Special Session of the UN General Assembly last week, the climax of multiple similar regional and other preparatory meetings. Its main outcome was this long .

As a media specialist, I confess consistent bafflement about much of the anti-corruption debate. I believe independent journalism is really effective in deterring corruption, and I often look to see if support for it is prioritised in anti-corruption efforts. When it isn’t – which is almost always – I wonder on what basis decisions are being made and strategies prioritised. The logic increasingly escapes me.

Almost every evidence review or research paper I read concludes that very few anti-corruption strategies appear to work. Professor Heather Marquette concludes in this just published Westminster Foundation for Democracy paper, : “We also, frankly, don’t know if anti-corruption interventions succeed or fail because we don’t have accurate measures to work with.”

Curtailing media = rising corruption

That finding is consistent with multiple earlier evidence reviews. This 2015 from the UK Department for International Development concluded that “direct anti-corruption interventions, which were especially prominent during the 1990s and 2000s, including efforts such as anti-corruption authorities, national anti-corruption strategies, and national anti-corruption legislation… were found to be ineffective in combating corruption”. In contrast, it found that the evidence available “consistently indicates [that] freedom of the press can reduce corruption and that the media plays a role in the effectiveness of other social accountability mechanisms.” The same paper concluded that when media freedom is curtailed, corruption tends to rise, finding evidence of “restrictions to press freedom leading to higher levels of corruption in a sample of 51 developed and developing countries”.

On a purely evidential assessment, it would seem that investing in support to independent media should be among the central planks of any anti-corruption strategy. Prioritising media support would also help solve the challenges that Marquette highlights of measuring the impact of anti-corruption initiatives. Let’s take just three categories of measurement.

One is correlation between the existence of a free press and reduced rates of corruption (and indeed the absence of a free press and increased rates of corruption). As well as constituting a central plank of democratic theory for centuries, evidence reviews, such as that cited above, conclude this correlation has shown to be strong.

The second is the volume of public assets returned to the public purse as result of investigative or other forms of journalism. The Organised Crime and Reporting Project (OCCRP)  that more than US$7 billion in fines and assets have been seized as a result of its investigations and those of its partners. That seems a pretty convincing measure.

The playbook of 'wannabe' dictators

The third is to assess where those intent on corruption – especially authoritarian leaders – focus their political and financial efforts in order to act with impunity. As this famous 2004 from Stanford University proved, neutralising independent media is top of the list. And as the concluded this year, “The playbook of ‘wannabe’ dictators seems to have been shared widely among leaders in (former) democracies. First, seek to restrict and control the media while curbing academia and civil society. Then couple these with disrespect for political opponents to feed polarisation while using the machinery of the government to spread disinformation. Only when you have come far enough on these fronts is it time for an attack on democracy’s core: elections and other formal institutions.”  

If media wasn’t effective as a check on corruption, those who plan to be corrupt would not focus so much attention on neutralising it.

These are familiar arguments – that the role of, and support for, media is under-prioritised in anti-corruption discussions - which people like me have been making for years. Those arguments have had scant impact and last week’s UNGASS statement was only partially encouraging. The statement “notes with appreciation the important role of civil society, academia, the private sector and the media in identifying, detecting and reporting on cases of corruption”. It commits to “respect, promote and protect the freedom to seek, receive, disseminate and publish information concerning corruption, and ensure that the public has effective access to information, in accordance with the domestic laws of States.” And importantly, it strives “to provide a safe and adequate environment to journalists, and we will investigate, prosecute and punish threats and acts of violence, falling within our jurisdiction, committed against them.” 

But, like almost all anti-corruption discussions, it assumes that one of society’s most important capacities to deter and expose corruption – an independent media – requires no active support. It does nothing to ensure the future viability of the independent media sector. 

Single most important anti-corruption measure

Unfortunately for democracy and development, and for efforts to combat corruption, independent media are disappearing. The mainly advertising-based business model that has sustained independent media has eroded as advertising migrates to online platforms. The pandemic, and the associated characterised by huge volumes of disinformation (itself often deployed from governments and others to ensure impunity against corruption), have both highlighted how important independent journalism is in a crisis whilst dealing a further, sometimes fatal hammer blow to the finances of independent media. The pandemic has been to have cost newspapers more than US$30 billion in lost revenue. The UN Secretary General himself three weeks ago gave his to efforts to create a new .  “We cannot afford to let the pandemic to lead to a media extinction event,” he said. 

The single most important anti-corruption strategy a society can have is a free, independent, sustainable and pluralistic media sector. That, I’d argue, is a justifiable conclusion from the evidence base of what works and doesn’t. It is time to start supporting independent media.

One section of the UNGASS declaration might provide a platform from which to prioritise media support. It concerns the use of confiscated assets illegally acquired through corruption. The language is tortuous and highly provisional, but it urges consideration of “the Sustainable Development Goals in the use of returned assets” and “reinvesting funds for special purposes”.

The reinvestment of confiscated assets to support independent media, and especially investigative journalism, is an argument that organisations like have been making for years, and an investigative journalism fund has been built into the design of the International Fund for Public Interest Media. 

Anti-corruption strategies need to start factoring in that a failure to support independent media will hamper future anti-corruption efforts and prospects. And the weakening of what media remain will provide huge new opportunities for corruption. Those intent on corruption, who have often been most determined to attack, intimidate or co-opt independent journalism that threatens to expose them, can then look forward to sleeping more easily in their feather beds. 

James Deane is Head of Policy for ±«Óãtv Media Action, co-founder of the  and consultant to on the Fund.

Independent media are vital to enabling peaceful and effective development. But that role has rarely been so endangered, with the consequences for governance and democracy so great. The international response to the threat is poorly prioritised and poorly organised.

The crisis confronting independent media around the world is a crisis of democracy, freedom and human rights. It is also a crisis with profound implications for development and peace.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the publication of the classic work, Development as Freedom by Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen. “No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy,” he wrote, arguing elsewhere that the question of food and starvation could not be divorced from “the issue of liberties, of newspapers and ultimately of democracy.” This analysis holds remarkably true, but depends upon media being capable of playing its assumed role – able to expose wrongdoing, mismanagement or emerging crises, and to have public legitimacy sufficient that government feels impelled to respond.

Those assumptions are being challenged. Media institutions around the world, especially in resource-poor settings, are increasingly co-opted by those in, or close to, power. There is growing evidence that the public is losing trust and confidence in information and news, as online misinformation and disinformation flourishes. The business models capable of supporting public interest media are disappearing as advertising moves online. Many countries are losing the essential safety valve that Sen argued was vital if calamitous mistakes were not to be made.

An increasing risk of famine is just one probable consequence. Vaccination boycotts and attacks on health outreach workers prompted by misinformation campaigns are becoming increasingly common and are proving a major obstacle to the elimination of polio and a central factor in the resurgence of formerly manageable diseases such as measles.

The evidence that a free media acts as one of, if not the most, effective check on corruption is venerable and long standing. Fear of journalistic scrutiny helps explain the tragic escalation in killings and attacks on journalists documented by media freedom monitors in recent years. As free and independent media declines, incidences of corruption can be expected to increase, with concerning knock-on effects for development and social cohesion. Corruption is a principal driver of violent extremism and social unrest. Without media as a principal check on corruption, there are broader, deeply concerning consequences for governance.

Elections are becoming ever less democratic. Evidence is emerging of the manipulation of electoral processes principally through subverting information and communication spaces and controlling independent media. Elections are increasingly susceptible to manipulation by those adept at exploiting big data (and those who pay for such manipulation). Hate speech is on the rise and social cohesion, already often weak in fragile states, increasingly undermined. Misinformation and disinformation have become endemic, contributing to social tension and conflict, and access to trusted and trustworthy information from domestic media has declined.

The increasing fragmentation and fracturing of media has accompanied a decline in independent media capable of engaging people across societal divides, undermining society’s capacity to negotiate differences. The decline in channels for public debate, shared public spaces and trusted reference points for national public conversations is contributing to a rise in suspicion, blame and stigmatisation of the “other” in society.

There is a long and growing list of consequences of the loss of independent media, yet effective responses to the challenge have been scant. International response needs to be better prioritised, better organised and better resourced. Important new initiatives have emerged in recent months including the Information and Democracy Commission launched by Reporters without Borders and the July 2019 Defend Media Freedom conference organised by the UK and Canadian governments.

Another initiative, proposed by ±«Óãtv Media Action, is the creation of a new, ambitious . Loosely modelled on the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, it focuses on supporting independent media in settings where market failure is especially acute or media freedom especially under threat. With the support of , we have recently completed a consultation document outlining how such a Fund might be governed, structured and operated. Such a Fund would serve to galvanise international donor support, essential in protecting not only independent media, but the gains in peacebuilding and good governance to which they are essential.

The consultation document is available on request from the author.

At ±«Óãtv Media Action we are dedicated to the cause of media freedom – the principle that expression and communication through media is a right that should be exercised freely -which is at the very core of effective democracies and inclusive societies. This freedom can never be taken for granted, and cannot be exercised in many places around the world.

This World Press Freedom Day commemorates another dark year, with precipitous plunges in rankings on media freedom indices and increasing – and increasingly egregious – attacks on journalists, most notably the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

Independent, sustainable public interest media are increasingly threatened, not just by laws and politics, but also by economics and the sheer pace of technological change. Each day, we see media co-opted by the powerful, and challenged to secure income that comes without strings attached, especially as more and more advertising revenue becomes concentrated in the pockets of those with a powerful hold over online eyeballs and clicks.

This crisis faced by public interest media, particularly in resource poor settings, is so great that we at ±«Óãtv Media Action are working hard to apply fresh thinking, advance new strategies and mobilise substantial new resources to address it.

±«Óãtv Journalist, Hassan Arouni, interviewing members of the community in Sierra Leone

Community voices in Iraq- Al Mirbad

Mentoring programme in Zambia

Haba na Haba community discussion

A future agenda for media assistance cannot simply repeat the same strategies that have applied – sometimes successfully, sometimes not, in the past. What do we know has worked, what do we know has not worked, what might work in the future?

I suspect there is widespread agreement that the democratic information space of the future will require strong, public interest institutions capable of generating journalism and other media content capable of underpinning informed public debate. The arguments of a decade ago, that citizen journalism would replace journalistic institutions, and , now seem perilously outdated. Our information spaces have rarely been more vulnerable to manipulation and distortion, our public debate rarely more driven to polarisation and subject to echo chamber effects, and people’s trust in the information they receive, rarely weaker.

Access to information that people can trust, find relevant, that underpins informed democratic debate, and can hold power to account, will depend on the existence of media institutions, not just information networks. That remains the major challenge of media support. It is a challenge that we need fresh thinking to achieve.

The most obvious area where we can expect action is in continuing and perhaps revamping media investment strategies. The dream, some would argue chimera, of media assistance has been to invest in the kinds of independent media who can develop a sustainable business model sufficient to support high quality independent, public interest journalism. There have been good examples where this approach has worked and fostered fantastic, independent news organisations, most notably through . I stand to be corrected but I think most (but certainly not all) of those successes have been in large markets (like Indonesia and Malaysia). The challenge comes when applying this approach in smaller markets, particularly in fragile states, given the current economic and political realities.

Fragile states have two overlapping challenges. The market is small and often highly fractured making it extremely difficult to build a profitable business model capable of sustaining independent journalism. That challenge has grown as digital and social media has, as it has done elsewhere, diverted funding away from independent media markets. 

The second is that politics has proved overwhelmingly powerful.

I had the privilege of working alongside wonderful Ugandan colleagues in the 1990s, as the media market – print and broadcast - thrived in the wake of economic and political liberalisation. The opening of economic and political space led to media, such as that owned by the Monitor Group, doing perhaps the best journalism in Africa, and outstanding innovations such as “ebimeeza” open air radio talk shows. All of which did much to nourish the democracy that was emerging after the authoritarian horrors of the Amin and Obote years. This was an entrepreneurial, commercial revolution built on the individual commitments and journalistic talents of remarkable people. It enabled, as never before, communicative power to leak from government to citizen.

We have witnessed, since the mid-2000s, the slow death of the independent media sector in the country . Partly, these businesses were never going to be money printing machines given the broader challenges the internet brought to almost all media markets. But much of it was that pressure from government and other political actors simply became too strong.

This is just one example but it is a familiar story in fragile states with weak economies characterised by highly contested politics. The political markets have outgunned the economic markets. It is not that the market is simply not there (although it is probably increasingly the case that it isn’t). It is that the political pressures that come with doing good journalism and forming an independent media and creative industry blew market forces away. It is a story told in different ways, in different contexts and with different drivers in the vast majority of states our own analysis at ±«Óãtv Media Action has focused on in recent years including , , , , and

That doesn’t mean the market cannot form part of the solution. It means we need to spark a creative debate about making markets work for freedom. This will mean calling on economists, technologists, and political scientists - not just media - and drawing on experience and existing research into market economies in fragile states. This requires a real interdisciplinary approach of the kind that our academic, organisational and donor structures have proved poorly equipped to facilitate in the past.

But, however imaginative the proposals, the market will not provide a long-term solution to supporting public interest media. It hasn’t in the past, and conditions, especially in fragile states, are just too hostile for it to be expected to do in the future - which is why we need to think, equally creatively, about public subsidy.

This does not necessarily mean rolling out a ±«Óãtv-style public service broadcast model It means looking at solutions that can provide sustained investment in independent media over a significant period of time. Can entertainment media be levied to support public interest journalism? Can public interest media funds be set up within countries where public interest media is most threatened? Can we think of other ways in which licence fees for public interest media can be raised? (there are many models for this), can the value inherent in data cross-subsidise good journalism? I don’t pretend to have answers, but there needs to be creative thinking about what those answers should be, without resting on the assumption that investment automatically leads to commercial sustainability.

More fundamentally still, solving these issues will be insufficient if they don’t connect with people. Much media support has focused on media for a relatively elite audience. Media freedom and media sustainability indicators focus on whether media is free and sustainable and less on on whether they are valued, trusted or relevant to the populations of their societies, especially those outside an educated middle class. This is especially important at a time of digital and demographic transformation.

The donor and media assistance community are finally realising there are no digital, magic bullets to these problems and that the digital revolution is as much a driver of market failure and disinformation and a wrecker of public interest media as it is an enabler of it (although there remain many exciting opportunities). But it is a transformation whose effects have only just started to take hold (smart phone access is still far from universal but in a small number of years it will be) and any media support strategy that does not root itself in the realities of 21st century information and communication networks access will fail.

And finally here, we need to pay more attention to re-balancing the incentive structures so that there is a greater political price to be paid for political interference in independent media – that means really embarrassing and holding to account in a much more insistent way those who are shutting down or co-opting the media. This would consist of further investment in media freedom advocacy and a much more robust approach and focused interest from governments committed to democracy and freedom of expression both North and South (sadly a diminishing number – in both number and power). Attacks on media freedom and independent media systems proliferate because those behind the attacks prosper and get away with it. Events such as organised by UNESCO take on greater importance in this context.

There are plenty of other areas we can talk about – improving support to media around elections (which is generally very poorly prioritised, organised and integrated into electoral support strategies), understanding and more effectively supporting public interest media in the context of violent extremism, working out how best to support independent journalism in fragile states where the risks are so often so great, better structuring media support within governance programming and much more besides. These issues present challenges for all of us.

I talk about just some of things ±«Óãtv Media Action is planning especially in my area of research and policy.

James Deane is director of policy and research at ±«Óãtv Media Action.

The UK Department for International Development’s commitment to undertake a “transparency revolution” is welcome. Their new strategy outlined yesterday  sets out a fresh set of commitments to close loopholes that allow corruption to be hidden; support efforts to make DFID’s partner governments more open and transparent, and scale up DFID’s broader support for transparency and accountability efforts.

The opening paragraph of the Secretary of State, Penny Mordaunt’s introduction, closely reflects ±«Óãtv Media Action’s strategic mission in stressing that access to information is critical to enabling people to “have a say in decisions which affect our lives”. The commitment to “scale up support for a healthy, free media and civil society that can champion anti-corruption and transparency and promote debate and uptake of data” is especially welcome.

For the strategy to be effective, however, those of us working in development could learn from some of the mistakes of the past. Three points in particular stand out.

1. Access to information is not enough. For many years, it was assumed that opening up government data and other information would automatically improve transparency and herald a new era in which citizens would shine a light on poor government performance or inadequate service delivery.  and, indeed, for some time, . The data generated as a result of  have provided immense energy and focus to transparency efforts - but translating that data into forms that are easily usable by those who most need the transparency and accountability agenda to work for them continues to be a struggle.

To its credit, DFID’s strategy acknowledges this. “Too often, data is not presented in an understandable way that enables citizens to find, interpret and use it”, it argues. “Evidence must also be accessible to parliaments, audit offices, media and civil society organisations that can monitor and champion improvements in services.” But in many places media that can “monitor and champion” struggles to exist. Media needs support to develop the skills, systems and mindset to do this and to survive long term. We are witnessing a global assault on independent media especially in . The closing of civic space by often authoritarian government is reinforced by increasing attempts to co-opt and capture independent media by multiple commercial, factional, religious, ethnic and other political interests. Independent media, especially in fragile states with weak economies, are simply not able to afford to able to resist such co-option.

It was a neat coincidence that saw this strategy launched on the same day that the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, gave a speech stressing just how critical journalism is as a “huge force for good” in fostering informed public debate in society. The Prime Minister especially highlighted how “in recent years - especially in local journalism - we've seen falling circulations, a hollowing-out of local newsrooms, and fears for the future sustainability of high quality journalism”. That is indeed the case in the UK.

The consequences in fragile states of weak media systems are more profound, and the challenges of enabling the independence and sustainability of good journalism acutely difficult. When you add to these challenges the increasingly successful exploitation of online platforms to misinform, polarise public debate and undermine the democratic processes, the prospects for seeing open government being translated into more accountable and transparent governance seem still more distant. It is becoming critical that development agencies reconsider and reprioritise their support to independent media.

2. DFID’s strategy makes another welcome proposal in its commitment to test “innovative approaches” in four African countries where it will support efforts to “work with civil society, law enforcement and investigative journalists to use greater transparency, to help drive forward investigations and prosecutions of incidences of corruption.” The potential benefit of supporting investigative journalism is undeniable. The Global Investigative Journalism Network has argued that the revelations exposed in the Panama Papers and other investigative efforts constitute one of the . But, as we have argued before, – the day to day job of journalists reporting on what government is doing, asking challenging questions which demand answers and working to underpin informed public debate. Investigative journalism needs to be complemented by support to independent media systems that are fundamental to the kinds of democratic politics that deliver for those who most need it.

3. Which raises the final challenge of linking transparency initiatives to all in society, and especially those who most need a say in the decisions that affect their lives. Our work at ±«Óãtv Media Action, as well as mentoring many journalists and building the capacities of hundreds of media institutions, focuses on ensuring that those with least access to decision-making power have the opportunity to challenge and question their political leaders. Through the much-valued support of DFID, broadcast public debates and other programmes . They reached almost 200 million people across 14 fragile states; from an earthquake-devastated Kathmandu slum to the presidential palace in Afghanistan, to a disaster-affected Bangladeshi city to an Ebola-affected Sierra Leone.

The evidence that an independent media is essential to improving transparency and accountability is . The damage to effective governance of not having an independent media

DFID’s strategy is welcome and important. Ultimately the future success of transparency and accountability efforts will depend on a more ambitious, more sustained and more determined international support effort to an increasingly imperilled independent media around the world. The UK has a set of media support institutions that have strong reputations and unrivalled capacities to contribute to such efforts. Our hope is that this strategy is just the start of a stronger cross-government commitment to support an increasingly vital but imperilled sector.

James Deane is Director of Policy and Research and ±«Óãtv Media Action.

On the International Day of Democracy, James Deane sets out six ways in which a resurgent public interest media can help improve accountability and foster transparency.

Strategies being used to improve accountability and foster transparency are not working well enough.

Corruption is on the rise, people do not feel that traditional institutions are delivering effective accountability, and there is a decline in trust in institutions as a whole. Authoritarianism and populism are resurgent.

The solutions to these challenges are huge but I want to set out six things which need to happen if democracy support is to become more effective.

1. We will pay more attention to the behaviour of people who do not want to be held to account.

People who do not want to be held to account buy up the media, intimidate journalists and civil society activists, and close down civic and information spaces. They do this because they know these often present the greatest threat to their interests. Democracy support needs to get better – more organised, more strategic and more effective – at countering such attempts. At present multiple parties are sowing misinformation, disinformation and confusion to foster their own agendas. Some of this is international – the role of Russia is often highlighted. Much of this occurs within countries.  

The economic markets capable of supporting independent media, especially in fragile states where ±«Óãtv Media Action mostly works, have not yet materialised. It is largely politics, rather than economics - let alone the public interest - that shapes the media people have access to. We are concerned that support for building independent media is falling among western donors at exactly the time when it is most in peril, when business models are most fragile and where its contribution to effective governance is increasingly recognised and evidenced. The opposite needs to happen.

2. We will refresh our understanding of just how critical and effective public interest media is in holding power to account and fostering functioning democracies.

This has already begun. We have seen the dramatic contribution investigative journalism has played, and the outstanding work of organisations like the especially around the Panama Papers. But, in many fragile states, investigative journalism is very dangerous activity and it is not a replacement for a functioning independent media sector focused on serving a public interest. ±«Óãtv Media Action supports independent media especially in conflict affected and fragile states. Last year we worked with more than 100 media partners – state, commercial, community and online – and reached almost 200 million people with our governance programmes. Our data shows us that people exposed to these programmes know more, discuss more and participate more in politics than those who do not.

3. We will look again at the relationship between open societies, especially a free media, and political stability.

The excuse often used by regimes that constrict free media and civil society is that they are maintaining stability and deterring terrorism. We will understand better the relationship between corruption and radicalisation. We will see that shutting down freedoms, media and public debate and shrinking civic space will, as it always has, allows corruption to thrive. Corruption breeds radicalisation. Many laws passed in the name of increasing security that close down civic space, will breed more corruption and fuel radicalisation.

4. Digital media could still deliver properly on its promise in delivering improved accountability and transparency.

But only when the digital promise (or – as some increasingly regard it - threat) moves from an innovation/hype-based debate to an evidence-based one. 2019 will see the 30th anniversary of the World Wide Web. We need to start looking much more seriously at what really works and what does not across the whole accountability and transparency agenda - including digital.

5. The open government movement will move from a supply side set of solutions to a demand side one.

Many transparency and accountability initiatives like the excellent have focused on opening up government, and particularly in ensuring governments make information – on budgets, on services – more available so ordinary citizens can hold expenditure to account. That supply of information has not yet been matched by a demand for it. Increasingly there needs to be a focus on enabling journalists and civil society actors to make sense of the information made available through open government initiatives and make it relevant to those people who most need to act on it to make accountability work.

6. Finally, we will understand that without rebuilding trust in our institutions, and trust in the information that people – especially young people - have access to, trust in democracy will be fundamentally challenged. Tackling the trust deficit will be central to any notion of success in the future.

James Deane is director of policy and research at ±«Óãtv Media Action.

This blog is an edited version of remarks made to the conference, “Global Values in an Uncertain World” (September 12-13 2017) marking the occasion of the foundation’s 25th anniversary.

A free and independent media that holds politicians to account on behalf of citizens has long been held up as a cornerstone of a thriving democracy.

In Sierra Leone, we ran a radio debate show called (Talk about Sierra Leone) (TBS) that tried to do just that. On air for over four years, TBS followed a classic ‘question and answer’ (Q&A) format and gave ordinary people a platform to quiz their leaders. The underlying idea was that citizens would take the opportunity to demand greater accountability from government, resulting in better service delivery.

TBS achieved a great deal. The show had an audience of over a million people and those who regularly listened to it were three times more likely to get involved in politics than those who never tuned in.

Yet despite its successes, the TBS model of confronting leaders and demanding responses might not be the best way of in Sierra Leone. Argument often turns to frustration while conversation – if inclusive, nuanced, constructive – can breed a deeper sense of satisfaction, of progress.   

Unwilling politicians, uncomfortable audiences

The biggest challenge faced by the TBS producers was that most senior government figures consistently refused to appear on the show. We often had to explain to our audiences that a chair was empty because a politician had failed to honour our invitation. It seems that leaders feel little obligation to make media appearances that will require them to answer difficult questions.

And even if an official does turn up, there’s no guarantee it’ll go well. During , a Bank of Sierra Leone representative got up and walked straight out of the studio as soon as he realised that another panellist was a previous governor of the Bank.

Even when panellists stay for the whole show, both they and the audience aren’t particularly comfortable with the Q&A format. Many Sierra Leoneans think questioning, especially of ‘big people’, is just plain rude.

Instead, the audience are often more interested in making statements than enquiries. Sharing information appears to be a better starting point for solving persistent, local problems. Audiences seem to find that leading with their own personal experiences and opinions sparks the types of productive and honest conversations with leaders, which leave them more satisfied that issues will actually be addressed.

An ideal political discussion? Frank and fruitful

This all brings us to consider the sorts of issues that audiences most want addressed. According to a in 2015, the top priority for 75% of Sierra Leoneans is service delivery. People want the media to cover the local issues that affect them directly, , which don’t feel as relevant to their lives.

For example, one TBS episode was recorded in an area affected by a large mining operation. A local chief in the audience stood up and spoke about the problems faced by local communities. Notably, he spoke in Temne, a local language, instead of Krio, the national lingua franca normally used on the show. As Temne is the first language of the communities most affected by the issues, his words carried added authority, and helped his comments strike a chord with both the live audience and those listening at home. Swayed by the chief’s words, the mining company’s representative on the panel pledged to do more to help those affected by the company’s operations.   

Another TBS episode, taped in Kono district during the 2012 local elections, helped resolve tensions between the two main parties following an incident of political violence. Both parties committed publicly to participating peacefully and issued warnings that supporters who acted otherwise would be expelled. There were no other outbreaks of violence for the rest of the election period and our hope is that the show helped contribute to this.

In recognition of the importance that audiences place on improving local service delivery, we've been supporting local radio stations to develop and produce their own local debate shows that are more responsive to the specific needs of their district.

A more solutions-focused approach?

To figure out how to best improve accountability in Sierra Leone, it might be useful to : ‘answerability’ and ‘responsiveness’. Answerability requires decision-makers to explain their actions to the public. Responsiveness is more about behaviour – the extent to which public institutions and leaders take notice of citizens’ needs and try to meet them.

Q&A programmes typically aim to achieve answerability. But Sierra Leonean audiences are unlikely to ask the tough questions needed to achieve this goal. Even if they did, their leaders don’t typically have the skills and confidence to answer them well.

Responsiveness, on the other hand, aligns more closely with Sierra Leonean culture. Having two-way conversations, rallying around a shared goal, recognising problems for what they are, giving leaders space to move beyond a problem towards solutions that everyone can get behind. These things all come far more naturally to Sierra Leoneans; they also seem to value them more.

Through providing platforms for shared problem-solving, the media could prove even more successful at engaging audiences and improving accountability. The recipe for success will likely be holding conversations that lead to practical improvements to services, which people will notice in their everyday lives.  

This approach has parallels with ‘’, which is about reporting on ways of improving the future, in addition to examining the problems of the present.

We’re currently applying these ideas to our new national radio show  (We the people), which aims to build a more meaningful and honest dialogue between decision-makers and ordinary people. A recent episode on the national school feeding programme looked at why the scheme works better in certain areas than others. The episode featured a government official promising to apply lessons from the most successful areas elsewhere.

The lessons we learned from broadcasting TBS have proved invaluable in adapting our programmes to more closely matche the public’s interests and behaviour. With Wi Di Pipul, we will continue to involve Sierra Leone’s leaders and audiences in meaningful and honest conversations, to further enhance accountability in the country.

has been the Country Director for ±«Óãtv Media Action in Sierra Leone since 2010. George previously worked for Village Aid, a small UK NGO specialising in non-formal learning and empowerment approaches. George has also completed 2 years as a VSO volunteer in the Niger Delta and previously spent 2 years working with Accenture. 

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